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Monetary Policy, Financial Stability and Interest Rate Rules 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial stability is currently the focus of most Central banks around the world. The topic started 
to received increasing attention in policy debates well before the severe subprime mortgage crisis 
hit international financial markets in the Summer of 2007, leading to relevant bank failures and 
extraordinary financial and rescue interventions by the FED and other central banks and monetary 
authorities. Indeed, despite global progresses made in the fight against inflation, many episodes of 
financial and currency crises have continued to challenge the international financial system, in both 
emerging and industrial countries.   
It is then somehow natural that central banks devote always more attention to how to prevent or 
reduce the risk of a financial crisis and of contagion waves. Recently, this has also been considered 
a rationale in support of the stylized fact that interest rates seem to move gradually in response to 
changes in macroeconomic conditions (notably output gap and inflation).  It has been  argued that 
by making interest rate changes smaller and more predictable, Central Banks reduce the volatility of 
commercial banks’ profits and lower the risk of bank insolvencies.  
In this paper, we evaluate the empirical properties of interest rate rules that explicitly take into 
consideration the target of financial stability and its interaction with the canonical mandate of 
central banks to pursue and maintain price stability.  
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies of different kinds of central banks’ reaction functions 
have been presented in the literature. A recent strand of research focused on central banks’ practice 
of smoothing interest rate movements by showing the optimality of such behaviour. In particular, 
Woodford (1999) showed that interest rate smoothing is an essential ingredient of optimal monetary 
policy under commitment, and Woodford (2003b) showed that it is optimal to delegate (under 
discretion) monetary policy to a central bank with an interest rate smoothing term in the objective 
function.  Moreover, Woodford (2003a) and Bullard and Mitra (2007) showed that monetary inertia 
can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy (and learning) of stationary rational expectations’ 
equilibria. And in general, interest rate rules which embed backward interest rate smoothing seem to 
perform empirically well in a variety of countries and in different data samples (see for instance 
Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 1998). 
However, in the literature, interest rate smoothing is usually simply assumed, without any formal 
link to interest rate risk management by banks. Given the hedging practices related to interest rate 
risk followed by banks and other financial institutions, it is by no means obvious why central banks 
should smooth interest rates. In this paper, we justify such behaviour by assuming that central banks 
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will try to stabilize “basis” risk, i.e. the residual risk that remains after all imperfect hedging 
opportunities have been exploited (see Hull, 2000), as a contribution to financial stability (see Di 
Giorgio and Rotondi, 2007).  We show that the desire of central banks to stabilize basis risk leads to 
interest rate rules characterized by either “backward” or “forward” interest rate smoothing, 
depending on the definition of the “basis” risk adopted and we estimate a set of interest rate rules 
for the Fed coherent with such modelling.  Our empirical investigation confirms the practice of 
backward interest rate smoothing; it also provides some support to the importance of the future 
expected interest rate as an additional argument in the reaction function of the Federal Reserve.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses risk management practices used by banks 
and argues that these lower (although do not eliminate) the necessity for the central banks to smooth 
interest rates as a contribution to financial stability. Section 3 presents a simple New Keynesian 
theoretical model that in equilibrium lead to different specifications of central banks interest rate 
rules embedding either backward or forward interest rate smoothing. In section 4 we evaluate the 
empirical performance of such interest rate rules for the US economy. Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
2. Risk management, “basis” risk and monetary policy.  
Mostly everywhere, safeguarding the stability of the financial system has been considered a key 
function of the central bank.  In different institutional arrangements this responsibility has been 
assigned only to the central bank or also to the central bank2, via some sharing mechanism with 
other financial regulatory and supervisory agencies or government bodies. Safeguarding financial 
stability requires controls over financial exchanges, clearing houses, payment and securities 
settlement systems that are usually assigned to the central bank. While performing this task, 
however, central banks should carefully consider its interaction with traditional monetary policy 
targets. In this perspective, many authors have interpreted the observed practice of smoothing 
interest rates undertaken by central banks as directed to preserve the stability of financial markets.3 
By responding slowly over a period of several months to changes in macroeconomic conditions, the 
central bank reduces the size of unanticipated changes in short-term interest rates that banks and 
other participants in financial markets have to face. The main reason why sharp changes in short-
term policy rates may damage banks’ profits is that banks tend to borrow short and lend long. 
Although financial institutions have increasingly used interest-rate related derivatives as part of 
                                                 
2 See Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999). 
3  See the empirical evidence reviewed in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000). 
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their strategy for managing exposure to interest rate risk,4 such contracts may not remove all the 
risk arising from maturity mismatch. These hedging instruments do not allow banks to insure 
against fluctuations in the rate of interest they pay on short-term deposits and reserves, which is 
closely related but not identical to the overnight rate.  Banks remain exposed to the risk of 
fluctuation in the cost of their deposits with respect to the overnight rate, a residual risk which is 
known as “basis” risk (Hull, 2000). Although in theory the risks to banking and financial stability 
posed by movements in short-term interest rates should have only a limited influence on monetary 
policy decisions, in practice the residual basis risk may still induce some caution on the part of the 
central bank, as banks cannot insure against it. In any case, it is somehow peculiar that 
considerations about the risk management of interest rate risk by banks – and in particular the 
concern for basis risk as an important source of interest rate risk exposure - are totally absent in the 
literature that analyses the nexus between monetary policy and financial stability.    
In the following, we analyze how monetary policy may be conducted by central banks that care 
about financial stability but are also aware of the instruments that banks may use to hedge against 
the risk of sharper policy decisions. We will focus on interest rate rules that embed a particular type 
of financial stability objective in the central bank reaction function. 
 
3. Interest rate rules 
In this section, we will present a simple version of a pretty standard theoretical model of the 
business cycle. In order to derive or rationalize (instead of simply assuming) interest rate 
smoothing, we introduce in the central bank’s rule a reaction to the “basis” risk, which takes into 
account that banks hedge risks of interest rates changes by actively using futures contracts. As 
discussed above, this hedging behavior is relevant for financial institutions, but may still justify 
some limited financial stability concerns from the point of view of monetary authorities. In our 
framework, “backward” or “forward” interest rate smoothing is showed to be induced by different 
but plausible modeling of a financial stability concern for the central bank.5  
 
  The baseline model. 
We follow the literature on New Keynesian microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models and 
assume: 
                                                 
4  Also, overdraft facilities or lines of credit are often made at variable interest rates, while fixed term loans are 
generally made at rates that allow for default risk and account only for a relatively small fraction of banks’ portfolios. 
5 In a companion paper, we derive and discuss the implications for equilibrium determinacy of the interest rate rules 
obtained by augmenting the policy reaction function with “basis” risk stabilization. See Di Giorgio and Rotondi (2007). 
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- a New Keynesian Phillips curve relating inflation positively to the output gap and to future 
expected inflation: 
 ,1++= tttt Eky πβπ                                                            (1)  
with 0<β<1 and k>0; 
              
- a IS curve relating the output gap positively to its future expected value and negatively to the 
current real interest rate: 
        ),( 11 ++ −−−= ttnttttt ErryEy πσ                                               (2)   
with σ>0. 
The model represents a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions under the 
assumption of a deterministic steady state. Hence, all variables are expressed in log-deviation from 
their long run level. The nominal short-term interest rate rt is the instantaneous interest rate or 
continuously compounded interest rate and empirically could be approximated by the overnight 
interest rate (in the US, the Fed funds rate). Thus, if Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on a risk-
free one-period bond, then tt Rr log= , given the assumption of no arbitrage opportunities and 
complete financial markets.  
Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we assume that the natural rate of interest ntr is an exogenous 
stochastic term that follows an AR(1) process given by 
,1 t
n
t
n
t rr εω += −                                                                 (3)   
where 0<ω<1 and εt is an iid disturbance with variance 2εσ and mean zero.  
 
  “Backward” interest rate smoothing 
We close the model by assuming that monetary policy is formulated in terms of a feedback rule for 
setting the nominal short-term interest rate:  
                                                                               
)],log(log)log[(log 11 −− −−−++= tAttAtBRtytt FPFPyr φφπφπ                       (4) 
 
where the last term captures the intention of the central bank to stabilize “basis” risk because of the 
contribution that this policy might give to banking and financial stability. In the equation above, we 
assume that banks and other financial institutions manage risk by using futures: tF  is the price of a 
one-period eurodollar future contract and AtP  is the price of the asset underlying such future, i.e. a 
one-period eurodollar deposit. Again, these variables are expressed in log-deviation from their long 
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run level. In order to simplify the analysis, without affecting the results, we assume that the central 
bank smoothes the ratio of AtP  over tF , instead of the spread.
6  
In the interbank market, banks have the possibility of switching between a one-period Eurodollar 
deposit - i.e. lending to another bank for a one-period horizon - and a strategy of rolling over loans 
in the overnight market. When banks take a long position in the interbank market they might decide 
whether to hedge or not their investment. If we consider a hedge put in place at time t-1, the 
hedging risk is the uncertainty associated with the spread realized at time t and is termed as basis 
risk. When the price of the asset increases by more (less) than the futures price, the basis increases 
(decreases). This is referred to as a strengthening (weakening) of the basis. Moreover the Libor rate 
is strongly influenced by the (average) overnight rate expected to prevail over one-period ahead.7 
According to the policy rule (4), the central bank is concerned about the deviation of the spread 
between the price ratio of the future and of the underlying asset from its past level. This concern 
reflects the idea that, for banks being locked in hedging positions, failure to adjust reserves in 
response to unexpected rate changes would have direct impact on their balance sheet and 
profitability. It is important to observe that the spread considered above is an ex-post measure 
related to basis risk in a hedging situation. Hence, equation (4) explicitly assumes a central bank 
concern with stabilizing basis risk as a contribution to financial stability. By considering a one 
period future contract, it is possible to show that the central bank by setting the short-term interest 
rate according to (4) affects the basis risk by smoothing the basis over time. In order to see this we 
introduce the (quite common) assumption that futures and forward prices are perfect substitute.8 
This implies that 
 
.log tRAtt ePF =                                                                    (5) 
 
From (5), it also follows that 
.logloglog
;logloglog
111 −−− −=−
−=−
tt
A
t
tt
A
t
RFP
RFP
                                                       (6) 
 
                                                 
6 Notice that we model the concern of central banks for stabilizing basis risk by adding a response to an asset price in 
the policy reaction function. Bullard and Schaling (2002) and Driffill et al. (2006) already showed that introducing asset 
prices in the central bank’s interest rate rule may weaken the requirement for determinacy of the rational expectations 
equilibrium and potentially lead to macroeconomic instability. In an open economy model, this has been confirmed by 
Di Giorgio and Nisticò (2007), who show how reacting more intensively to stock price misalignments may ask for 
central banks’ stronger response to inflation in order to avoid indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibria.   
7 Notice that the relationship between the Libor rate and the overnight rate is not exact and the differences that might 
arise reflect another type of basis risk, that we analyze below (see Section 3.4). 
8 See for instance Hull (2000) for a discussion on the validity of this assumption. 
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Substituting (6) back into expression (4) and using the definition of the instantaneous rate we get 
 
( ).1−−−+= ttBRtytt rryr φφπφπ                                                        (7)     
 
From (7) we obtain the following policy rule 
 
   ;1 tyttt yrr Φ+Φ+= − πρ π                                                       (8)  
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                                                                (9)  
  
where the coefficient ρ, with 10 <≤ ρ , measures the degree of inertia in the central bank’s response 
to macroeconomic shocks. Notice that the rule (8) can be also rewritten as 
 
( ) ( )tyttt yrr φπφρρ π +⋅−+= − 11 , 
 
where we have a partial adjustment mechanism with a convex combination between the operating 
target, which specifies the reaction of monetary policy to changes in macroeconomic conditions, 
and the lagged interest rate. This formalization represents the standard specification used in the 
empirical literature on inertial interest rate rules. It also makes explicit the existence of a trade off 
between the objective of financial stability and the one of macroeconomic stabilization. In most 
empirical specification, and coherently with a fully developed micro based model, expected 
inflation replaces current inflation in the interest rate rule to estimate.   
Summing up, our analytical framework derives the partial adjustment mechanism implied by 
“backward” interest-rate smoothing from a Taylor-type rule augmented with a reaction to the 
change of the basis. From (8)-(9) it is possible to see that as +∞→BRφ  the current interest rate 
tends to the previous period level, and the change of the basis tends to zero.9 Accordingly, rational 
                                                 
9 Recall that all variables are expressed as log-deviations from their trend level and constants are omitted for simplicity. 
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agents expecting this behaviour from the central bank will find the basis risk reduced to zero. 
Clearly, +∞→BRφ  implies monetary policy following a super-inertial interest rate rule, with no 
reaction to deviations of inflation or output from their trend level.  
 
 An alternative definition of basis risk  
Thus far, we have assumed that the interest rate rule is augmented with a term that captures the 
intention of the central bank to stabilize one possible source of basis risk, namely the differences 
that might occur between the price of the underlying asset to be hedged – e.g. the eurodollar deposit 
- and the price of the future contract used – i.e. a eurodollar future contract. Here we consider a 
second type of basis risk, which is related to the differences that might arise between the Libor rate 
and the average overnight rate in a hedging situation. 
The one-period eurodollar future rate, EFtR , can be expressed as the sum of the expected future 
level of the underlying interest rate, i.e. the one-period eurodollar Libor rate EtR 1+ , and a risk 
premium as follows 
 
t
E
tt
EF
t RER θ+= +1 ,                                                                  (10) 
 
where tθ is the risk premium. As shown in Sack (2004) definition (10) can be modified to express 
the expectations in terms of the federal funds rate rather than the Libor rate as follows 
  
 ( ) tttEtttttEFt rRErER θ+−+= +++ 1,11, ,                                                (11) 
 
where 1, +ttr is the average of the daily Fed funds rates from t to t+1, when the futures contract is 
expiring.10 As the relationship between the Libor rate and the overnight rate is not exact, the term 
Et ( )1,1 ++ − ttEt rR  reflects another type of basis risk. The excess expected return of the Libor rate over 
the average overnight rate will typically be positive, reflecting that for a bank lending to another 
bank for a one-period horizon (1 month or 3 months) implies a greater credit risk than lending on an 
                                                 
10 Here for convenience we assume that the average is over the entire horizon of the futures contract. However, more 
correctly, the average should be referred only over the delivery period of the futures contract (i.e. near the expiration: 
for example for a three-month eurodollar futures contract we should take the average of the daily Fed funds rates over 
the delivery month).  
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overnight basis. Using the Expectations Hypothesis we can rewrite the expression for the basis risk 
as 
  
Et ( )EtEt RR −+1 .                                                                   (12) 
 
Now again we can think of a central bank trying to stabilise this type of basis risk and insert the 
term (12) in the interest rate rule as follows 
                                                                                      .                   
)log(log 1
E
t
E
ttBRtytt RREyr −++= +φφπφπ                                           (13) 
 
Again, these variables are expressed in log-deviation from their long run level and. We continue to 
assume that the central bank stabilises the ratio of EtR 1+  over 
E
tR , instead of the spread. It is 
important to observe that the spread considered above is an ex ante measure related to basis risk in a 
hedging situation. After substituting with the Fed fund rate and collecting terms we get 
 
tytttt yrEr Φ+Φ+= + πρ π1 ,                                                    (14) 
with expressions (9) holding also in this case. 
 
In equilibrium, the interest rate rule implies “forward” interest rate smoothing.11 Again, a similar 
specification could be obtained by replacing current with expected inflation in the original policy 
function of the central bank. 
 
In this section we have provided a financial stability – or more exactly a basis risk stabilization – 
motivation for including “backward” or “forward” interest-rate smoothing terms in the central 
bank’s interest rate rule. Notice that, under some restrictive assumptions, it is also possible to show 
that an interest rate rule with both “backward” and “forward” smoothing can be optimally derived 
in the framework used by Woodford (2003b) for examining monetary policy under a discretionary 
regime when the central bank has a (backward) interest-rate smoothing objective (see Di Giorgio 
and Rotondi, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
11 Di Giorgio and Rotondi (2007) have showed that in this case, a new trade-off between macroeconomic stability and 
financial stability can emerge as the conditions for equilibrium determinacy are no longer satisfied for +∞→BRφ . 
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4. Estimation 
In this section, we evaluate the empirical performance of different specifications of interest rate 
rules coherent with the theoretical representation offered above. Our main contribution is to assess 
the relevance of the expected future rate in the policy rule of the Federal Reserve.  
We start by estimating standard interest rate rules with inertia (backward smoothing) for the period 
from 1987-Q4 to 2005-Q3. In particular, we estimate the following baseline interest rate rules:  
 
( ) ,1 222111 ttttt rrrr θρρρρ ++−−+= −−                (15)           
And                                            ,ttyttt yEEr φπφφ π ++=                                                 (16)                    
Or     .1 ttyttt yEEr φπφφ π ++= +      (17)                    
 
Where tr  is an operational target. The estimation approach used is based on the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) and is the same as that of Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) for the case 
of the Federal Reserve.12 The second-order partial adjustment mechanism modeled in the 
specification is intended to capture the degree of monetary inertia by the Fed.  
The data used are the Federal funds interest rate, defined as the average effective Federal funds rate 
over the quarter, the output gap, defined as percent deviation of actual real GDP from the potential 
output estimated by the Congressional Budget Office, and inflation, measured as four-quarter 
change in the GDP deflator.13 We have used a correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of unknown form with a Newey-West fixed bandwidth, and chosen Bartlett weights to ensure 
positive definiteness of the estimated variance-covariance matrix.14 The instrument set includes the 
constant and 1-4 lagged values of output gap, inflation and the federal funds rate.15 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 we report the estimates obtained respectively for the backward-
looking specification (15)-(16) and the forward looking specification (15)-(17).  
                                                 
12 The econometric approach used relies on the assumption that, within our short sample, short term interest rates, 
inflation and output gap are I(0). However, standard Dickey-Fuller test of the null that the above series are I(1) is not 
rejected for the US. Nevertheless, as argued for instance by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998), standard Dickey-Fuller 
test has lower power against the alternative of stationarity for short samples. For this reason the assumption of 
stationary series is standard in the empirical literature of interest rate rules, as this literature is in general based on short 
samples with a stable monetary regime like in our case. 
13 Data on the Fed funds rate, output gap and inflation are taken from FRED, of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
14 The optimal weighting matrix is obtained from first-step Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) parameter estimates. 
15 The J-test reported in the tables is the test for the validity of the instruments used. The associated statistic is 
distributed as a χ2. 
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Next, consistently with the analysis developed in section 3, we include the expected future rate in 
the interest rate rules considered (backward and forward interest rate smoothing). We then estimate:  
 
( ) ,1 222111 titttttt rErrrr θμρρρρ +++−−+= +−−                                       (18) 
 
where either (16) or (17) holds. In the present analysis we have considered the expected future 
interest rate two quarters ahead.16 Rudd and Whelan (2005) show that in tests of the new-Keynesian 
Phillips curve GMM implies biased estimates when the instruments used belong to the true model 
of inflation.17 Thus, similarly to the case of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, we need to provide 
additional instruments not previously included in the interest rate specification.18 We choose as 
instruments for the expected future interest rate 1-4 lagged values of the rate on a eurodollar future 
contract that settles three months ahead, taken as the average rate over the quarter.  
As it is possible to see from the estimations reported in Table 1, the introduction of the expected 
future interest rate improves substantially the goodness of fit of the estimated policy rules. The 
coefficient of the expected future interest rate is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and 
positive, as expected. As it is possible to observe, the introduction of the expected future interest 
rate reduces the response to inflation and output.  
Overall, our empirical evidence supports the presence of the expected future interest rate as an 
additional argument of the Fed’s interest rate rule. 
 
5. Conclusions and future research 
This paper tries to link banks’ risk management practices and interest rate policy decisions by 
central banks who care about monetary and financial stability.  We assume that the central bank is 
aware that financial institutions may hedge against the risk of sharp interest rate movements by 
using derivatives. However, part of this risk, namely “basis” risk, cannot be hedged and hence 
provides a limited motivation for central banks to stabilize it as a contribution to financial stability. 
We show that the desire to stabilize basis risk leads central banks to smooth interest rates, either 
                                                 
16 We have considered also other forecasting horizons for the future interest rate, but for simplicity we have reported 
only the case with the best fitting and diagnostic outcomes. In particular, if we include the expected future interest rate 
one quarter ahead (not reported in the table) the goodness of fit improves compared to the baseline case without the 
future interest rate, but the response to inflation and output becomes not significant. While with forecasting horizons 
greater than two quarters ahead the goodness of fit worsens. Such estimations are available on request. 
17 See also the debate on the remedies proposed for solving this problem: Lindé (2005) and Rudd and Whelan (2007).    
18 As discussed by Rudd and Whelan (2005) the chosen instruments should also not be correlated with erroneously 
omitted variables in the interest rate specification.   
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backward or forward. Our estimates of different interest rate rules suggest that embedding backward 
and forward interest rate smoothing allows to improve the econometric specification and provides a 
better explanation of the conduct of the Federal Reserve in our sample.  
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Table 1 - Estimation of the Federal Reserve's interest rate rule
               Backward-looking specification                    Forward-looking specification
Standard inertial rule With expected future rate Standard inertial rule With expected future rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 1.40 0.92 1.41 0.95
20.59 15.27 20.74 17.16
Φ 1.77 -0.55 1.06 -0.72
1.50 -1.98 0.63 -1.82
Φπ 1.70 0.36 1.81 0.34
3.21 3.85 2.59 2.65
Φy 1.29 0.25 1.30 0.21
4.87 3.29 4.39 2.45
ρ2 -0.47 -0.19 -0.48 -0.20
-7.69 -4.44 -7.37 -4.82
μ 0.26 0.25
8.51 8.80
Adj. R2 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
S.E. 0.34 0.25 0.33 0.26
J-statistic 0.62 0.91 0.69 0.84
Notes : GMM estimation for the period 1987Q4 - 2005Q3. Adjusted R squared, regression standard error and the p-value
of the J-statistic for overidentifying restrictions are reported at the bottom of the table. Robust T-statistic in italics. 
 
